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Indonesia under the Soeharto administration has been considered a country 
with a poor human rights practice and record.1 Although Indonesia adheres to 
democratic forms, the government had been authoritarian. When Soeharto resigned 
in May 1998,2 it was believed that the end of authoritarian government would 
significantly improve human rights conditions in Indonesia.  
The objective of this article is to make an assessment of human rights 
practices in Indonesia in the post-Soeharto administration. At the outset this article 
will argue that structural and legal reform in a developing country does not 
necessarily have an instant effect in improvement of human rights practices at the 
society level. 
The article will first look into structural reform following a change of 
government. It is argued that a fundamental change in government, even from 
authoritarian to democratic, and a commitment from individuals occupying high 
ranking positions will not contribute to meaningful progress in human rights 
practices. In so doing the article will look into the commitment to uphold human 
rights by individuals occupying the post of President of the Republic of Indonesia 
after Soeharto.  
The topic following will assess how far change in the legal framework has 
influenced the improvement of human rights conditions. In this topic, it will be 
argued that although the government has passed new legislation and continued to 
                                                 
* This article is an updated version of the same article that appeared in the Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 7 (2) under the title of ‘Assessing 
Indonesia’s Human Rights Practice in the Post-Soeharto Era: 1998-2003.’ 
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ratify various international instruments, however the legal values have failed to be 
implemented at the society level. For this purpose, the assessment will discuss the 
conditions where the legal framework will work ineffectively.  
Based on the above structural and legal reforms in human rights, the article 
will then look into concrete implementation of these reforms. First, how structural 
and legal reform is applied to bring those accused of flagrant human rights in the 
East Timor and Tanjung Priok incidents. 
Another topic that will be discussed is the structural and legal reform in the 
field of human rights has been negatively impacted by the US led war against terror. 
Legislation has been passed legitimizing the abuse of human rights. Here it is 
argued that the war against terror has retarded the promotion of human rights in 
Indonesia.  
Before concluding, the article will make an assessment on the institutions 
working in the field of human rights. It is argued that the positive structural and 
legal reform in the field of human rights have allowed these institutions to develop a 
lack of focus in their human rights work. 
 
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE  GOVERNMENT’S COMMITMENT 
 
A. Human Rights under Four Presidents 
In the Indonesian political context, the government’s commitment to human 
rights depends on the individual commitments of those who occupy the position of 
President. This article will now describe the individual commitment of three 
Presidents following the Soeharto regime. 
Soon after Soeharto resigned from the office of President, Bacharuddin Jusuf 
Habibie took office, as he was the then Vice-President. In October 1999, Habibie was 
succeeded by Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid was installed as President by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in which half of the members were elected 
through the first democratic general election since 1955.  
In July 2001, Wahid was forced by the MPR to give up the office of President 
after tension between himself and the House of Representative (DPR) following an 
embezzlement scandal and allegations of incompetence. The office of President was 
then assumed by Wahid’s constitutional successor, the then Vice President, 
Megawati Soekarnoputri. Megawati served as President until 2004 serving out the 
remainder of Wahid’s term. 
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In October 2004 as a result of the first ever direct election, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono was elected as President. Yudhoyono will serve as President until 2009. 
Habibie, Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono have had different commitments 
to human rights. The different commitments are based on political necessity, 
personal views, and pressure coming from inside and outside of the political and 
social establishments. 
Habibie had placed human rights high on the agenda for his administration. 
Habibie wanted to distinguish his administration from that of the Soeharto regime. 
Politically this was necessary to gain public acceptance for and of his administration.  
The agenda was highlighted in the introduction of human rights legislation 
and ratification of international instruments. In a little over a year, Habibie’s 
administration had succeeded in reforming the legal framework that dealt with 
human rights. The administration had passed two Laws that dealt directly with 
human rights.3 Furthermore, Laws that restricted or in effect violated human rights 
were abolished.4 In addition, the administration had issued a Presidential Decree 
outlining a plan of action to improve human rights practices.5 In addition, a number 
of international treaties dealing with human rights were ratified.6 Apart from that, 
Habibie had released political prisoners and rehabilitated those who were accused of 
having involvement with the communist coup of 1965 and who had been held 
without trial. 
Under the Habibie administration, the Defense Minister, in August 1998, 
had announced the termination of Indonesia’s troubled province of Aceh status as an 
Area of Military Operations (Daerah Operasi Militer). 
For Wahid, human rights were also put high on the agenda because of his 
personal belief that human rights should be respected. Wahid’s intentions were 
sincere in upholding human rights. Despite this sincerity and hopes that human 
rights practices would improve it was evident that the bureaucracy and top-level 
government officials were unable to implement the vision that the President had 
spoken of. Changing the mindset at the bureaucratic level was proving to be even 
more difficult than had been envisaged and consequently human rights practices 
remain unchanged. 
Nevertheless, it was under the Wahid administration that the first ever 
Department that had exclusive responsibility for human rights issues was 
established.  
Wahid also stressed that Indonesian Chinese should be allowed to keep their 
Chinese names and to practice Confucianism. 7  He had promised that the 
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government would respect Confucianism as a religion. In addition, under his 
administration the Chinese Lunar New Year for the first time is declared as an 
optional State holiday.  
In dealing with the Aceh issue, Wahid had called for a peaceful solution 
through dialogue between the government and the separatist movement, Aceh 
Independence Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). Wahid even went as far as his 
predecessor Habibie had done for East Timor and proposed a referendum for Aceh. 
Wahid also called for a parliamentary investigation into the alleged human rights 
abuses that had occurred in Aceh.  
Wahid’s commitment to human rights was reinforced when he suspended his 
Minister for Security and Political Affairs, General Wiranto, to allow further 
investigation into the latters alleged role in the East Timor bloodshed following the 
popular consultation (jajak pendapat) of 1999. Wahid did this after the minister was 
named by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia / ‘Komnas HAM’) as one of those who needed to be investigated further by 
the Office of the Attorney General.  
During his term of office, Wahid continued to release political prisoners 
accused of subversion, defaming the government, and rebellion under the Soeharto 
regime. At one point he proposed that the Peoples’ Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
Decree banning communism and Marxism be lifted. In addition, under his 
administration, basic freedoms such as the freedom of the press and free association 
continued to flourish. 
In contrast to the Habibie and Wahid administrations, the Megawati 
administration never placed the maintenance and improvement of human rights 
conditions high on the Government agenda. It would seem that human rights is just 
one of many issues to be addressed under the Megawati administration and as such 
it has been relegated as an issue to a level commensurate with the importance it is 
given. Under Megawati, the government has been occupied with secessionist 
movements and the war on terror. Many people and organizations have openly 
criticized Megawati for lacking a strong commitment to human rights.8 There are 
many instances where human rights have been put aside when the Government had 
to face the threat of terrorism. To this end the Government has often been criticized 
for not affording proper protection to its nationals who have been detained by other 
countries as terror suspects. 
In spite of these criticisms of Megawati’s commitment to human rights, the 
reality is that it has been easy for the administration to disregard these criticisms. 
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Simply, there has been no significant domestic and international pressure for the 
administration to respect human rights. The administration has allowed the 
cultivation of the belief that an over-emphasis on human rights will result in 
increased suffering and that this emphasis is being imposed on Indonesia by foreign 
States not familiar with the conditions prevailing in Indonesia.  
This was not a difficult concept to cultivate as the public felt an acute 
awareness of the ramifications of foreign imposed human rights values under the 
Habibie and Wahid administrations. The Megawati administration suggested that 
the respect of human rights as required by foreign States have not contributed to the 
betterment of their lives but rather, and on the contrary, it has contributed to their 
increased suffering. The public’s dissatisfaction with the implementation of these 
human rights values has been directed towards human rights activists. There have 
been incidents where human rights activists and their offices have been attacked by 
‘certain people’ and organizations.9  
International pressure has been absent against the government since the 
war on terror was declared by the United States and President George W. Bush. Any 
pressures that may have been exerted did not result in any discernible policy shift to 
occur. The reality was that the Government had much less control in the post-
Soeharto period as regional autonomy took hold. This meant that limited 
implementation may have occurred and only at the lowest level of the government.  
President Yudhoyono continued commitments of previous presidents without 
any attempt to distinguish his programs from the others. There are several reasons 
for this. First, there was a recognition that human rights demands had ceased to be 
an important issue, even though implementation was poor and remains poor even to 
today. Second, the public have come to realize that respect of human rights may not 
be dependent solely on the President. Third, the Yudhoyono administration was 
elected primarily on a national economic revival platform.  
In the two years of the Yudhoyono administration, the administration has 
succeeded in passing the amended Citizenship Law of 1958 in July 2006. The Law 
abolished discrimination based on ethnicity and gender. The ethnic discrimination 
was primarily against the Indonesian Chinese who were previously require to prove 
their Indonesian citizenship through the acquisition of the Surat Keterangan 
Berkewa ganegaraan Republik Indonesia (SKBRI) which is simply a letter clarifying 
Indonesian citizenship. The letter was notoriously difficult to obtain, yet it was 
required of all dual citizenship Chinese Indonesians in the 1950s. Those Indonesians 
of Chinese heritage who did not hold a SKBRI encountered considerable difficulties 
r
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in all aspects of their daily lives including registering marriages, births, and deaths, 
among many other matters. The Law also purports to eliminate gender 
discrimination by permitting Indonesian mothers to pass on their nationality to 
their children in a mixed marriage. Previously the Law stated that children of a 
foreign father inherited the citizenship of their father irrespective of their mother’s 
citizenship. 
In 2005 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were ratified. 
Yudhoyono is also considered to have been successful in ending the Aceh insurgency 
by signing a Memorandum of Understanding dubbed the Helsinki Agreement in 
August 2005. This agreement in essence brought peace to the troubled region by 
calling an end to hostilities between the Government of Indonesia and the 
independence movement. In 2006 the administration established a joint Indonesia 
and Timor Leste Truth and Friendship Commission to uncover human rights abuses 
in East Timor during the popular consultation of 1999. In May of the same year 
Indonesia was elected as a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC), which replaced the old UN Human Rights Commission. 
Nevertheless, human rights activists have voiced concern over President 
Yudhoyono’s commitment to human rights and there are several indicators for this 
concern.  
The most often cited is the very slow investigation process into the death of 
human rights activist, Munir.  Munir is believed to have been murdered by arsenic 
poisoning on a flight from Jakarta to The Netherlands. The investigation process 
identified only one suspect who was sentenced for his part in the murder conspiracy. 
After the identification of this one suspect no further co-conspirators or suspects 
have been identified or prosecuted. The original sentence for the murder was 
overturned by the Supreme Court and the defendant was re-sentenced for falsifying 
duty-shift papers. The legitimate complaint being promoted by human rights 
activists is that despite there being general agreement that Munir’s death was 
suspicious and most likely he was murdered there has been no-one directly held 
accountable for his murder. 
The second concern is that the list of 42 nominees to fill in the 21 member 
vacancies on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Komisi Kebenaran dan 
Rekonsiliasi) has never been sent to the Parliament for selection and subsequent 
confirmation. Even more concerning for human rights activists is that in December 
2006 the Constitutional Court declared the Law establishing the commission to be 
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unconstitutional and annulled the law. The delay and subsequent annulment of the 
law has led to claims and allegations that Yudhoyono is protecting alleged human 
rights abusers and particularly those in the military. 
The third concern and although not directly involving the President it does 
involve his administration is the belief that the Attorney General is seen to be 
draggin his heels in the pursuit of the alleged perpetrators in the killing of four 
students of Trisakti University in the May riots of 1998 and most often referred to as 
the Trisakti tragedy. The Attorney General has insisted that the Parliament must 
first decide whether the tragedy is to be considered a gross violation of human rights 
before he is willing to commence an investigation. 
 
B. Sectoral Human Rights in the Post-Soeharto Administrations 
Human rights is a general term that covers many issues; ranging from a 
right to life through to a right to association and many other human rights in 
between. The sheer magnitude of the scope of human rights that exist makes for a 
challenging task to look at these rights from all possible aspects. Therefore, this 
paper will discuss just four of these aspects as a means of highlighting the 
significant and lack of significant progress at the society level. Two of these aspects 
that highlight significant progress are the freedom of speech and the freedom of the 
press. However, although there has been significant progress, this progress has also 
opened the door of opportunity for abuse to occur as well. The other two aspects that 
highlight a particular lack of progress from the Soeharto regime, and this is 
irrespective of the structural and legal changes, are the rights of workers and 
bringing those accused of flagrant and grave violations of human rights to justice.  
Freedom of speech has improved significantly in the period since the 
resignation of former President Soeharto. This process of freeing the press in actual 
fact started in the weeks before Soeharto resigned in May 1998. This period saw 
sustained and widespread rallies often led by university students. These rallies were 
public and garnered broad support from the community at large, including the mass 
media, making it increasing difficult for the police and military to clamp down.  
The freedom of speech meant that the public can voice almost any opinion 
without fear of prosecution. However, this was not an absolute freedom and any 
absolute freedom of speech is still not likely to be a reality in any literal sense. It is 
worth noting that the Constitutional Court recently struck down several provisions 
from the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana / KUHP) 
that made insulting the President or Vice-President a crime. Freedom of speech in 
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Indonesia is limited in many of the same ways as it is in other democracies with 
exceptions for slander, libel, and defamation, among others. Nevertheless, this 
freedom of speech meant that Indonesians for the first time were able to openly 
criticize Government policy and official actions without fear of being prosecuted or 
punished in some other repressive way.  
Unfortunately, with these freedoms comes responsibilities and a worrying 
trend of large public demonstrations and protests is that they end in violence and 
quite often with the destruction of both public facilities and private property. As one 
can imagine wide-scale and large public demonstrations often result in traffic chaos 
as they spill over from defined routes of protest to toll roads. However, in comparison 
this is a minor inconvenience when one considers that where protesters and 
demonstrators face-off against the police and military the end result is often rioting 
that ends in loss of life.10  
How to organize an orderly demonstration is not a problem or issue unique to 
Indonesia, but in an attempt to do so Indonesia has passed a law that requires all 
organizers of demonstrations or protests to obtain a permit prior to any 
demonstration taking place.11 Despite this initiative to regulate the demonstration 
process the first two years of the law has seen it to be an ineffective means of 
preventing either demonstrations from taking place or those demonstrations that 
have acquired the necessary permit from ending in violence or other wanton 
destruction of property. It has been allege that even where demonstrations had 
acquired the necessary permit the police lacked either the will or the desire or both 
to enforce the law based on the premise that any action they take may mean that 
they have violated an individuals right to freedom of speech or association. A more 
cynical take on the lack of police action is that the police are merely trying to prove a 
point with regard to the important role that police have in the community and in 
controlling demonstrating crowds. In any event it is a moot point, the issue hinges 
on whether the police are fulfilling their mandate in respect of controlling 
demonstrations. 
The criticism of the police has meant that in more recent times, however, the 
police have been more assertive in clamping down on illegal or poorly controlled 
demonstrations that do not comply with the Law. Individuals have been arrested, 
charged with the holding of unlicensed demonstrations, disturbing public order, 
smearing or stamping on pictures of the President and Vice-President, and for 
holding demonstrations on substantive issues that breach the provisions of the law. 
As was noted earlier the provisions relating to the President and Vice-President 
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have since been annulled. However, the provisions were still in force during the 
Megawati administration and were used to great effect by her administration to 
suppress public dissent, particularly personal criticisms of her, her administration, 
and the overall performance of Government. Clearly, the intent of freedom of speech 
is not to stifle legitimate public debate on Presidential performance and once again 
the recent Constitutional Court decision highlights a greater understanding of this 
principle in Indonesia’s continually developing democracy.  
An interesting, and not an altogether pleasing development, is the rent-a-
demonstration organizers, who for the right fee can assist in providing a protesting 
crowd for any issue that is required. The idea of the freedom of speech being 
subverted and commercialized in this way is worrisome as it is an easy means of 
manipulating public opinion and has often been used by powerful forces for this 
purpose. The demonstrations are artificial and people are there for either food or 
money or both and not because of a belief in a principle that needs recognition or 
protection. 
The freedom of speech has also led to increased commercial opportunities. 
The highly regulated mass media during the Soeharto regime meant only limited 
numbers of newspapers, magazines, tabloids, and radio and television stations were 
ever able to obtain the requisite licenses. Comparing the Indonesia of 2006 with the 
Indonesia of 1996 suggests that the Indonesian mass media can report on almost 
anything without any government censorship. ‘Almost’ is the key word here as the 
recent furor over the publication of the Indonesian version of Playboy magazine is 
sure to test the boundaries of what is and is not publishable in Indonesia 
As was noted with the freedom of speech, where there is a freedom there is 
also a responsibility to use this freedom in the proper way. The press has been 
accused of abusing this new found freedom by sensationalizing gossip and rumors by 
printing and publishing them as legitimate news without undertaking any accepted 
verification mechanisms to substantiate the gossip or rumor. This lack of 
responsibility has seen an explosion in tabloids that sensationalize sex, 
pornography, drugs, and other morally contentious or suspect activity. Some of the 
long-time criticisms remain that the media has not always been impartial in 
reporting and has often been manipulated by interest groups to promote particular 
points of view or beliefs. This is hardly unique to Indonesia as it is a criticism that 
has been leveled in many countries and against many media tycoons, one of which, 
Rupert Murdoch has been actively sourcing media interests in Indonesia. 
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However, a sign of a maturing media sector and regulatory framework that 
these abuses have led to increasing levels of accountability. Recently editors of mass 
media publications have been brought before courts to account for their actions. The 
first of these cases saw the editors facing criminal charges. The Rakyat Merdeka 
case is an example of this.12 The second series of cases saw editors facing a civil 
lawsuit for defamation. The case involved one of Indonesia’s premier news 
magazines, Tempo, and an Indonesian businessman with significant ties to the 
military, Tommy Winata13  and the other prominent case was Texmaco against 
Kompas, which is Indonesia’s leading broadsheet morning newspaper. Despite the 
concerns from the human rights community that these cases represent a significant 
threat to the freedom of the press, it also highlights the dilemma confronting all 
democracies, striking a balance between freedom of the press and responsibility for 
the ‘news’ published.  
The following two aspects of human rights have largely remained unchanged 
in society; the protection of the fundamental rights of labor and the bringing of those 
alleged to have committed flagrant and grave breaches of human rights in the near 
and distant past. 
Although a number of pieces of legislation have been passed and 
international conventions  have been ratified to ensure the protection of labor, there 
has been a clear lack of implementation resulting in no significant improvements 
being made. It is fair to say that the situation remains essentially the same as it was 
under the Soeharto regime. Indonesia has often been criticized for its lack of 
compliance with the eight ILO conventions that it has ratified to date.14
Indonesia on response to these criticisms often states that it is unable to 
comply as it must because it is still recovering from the financial meltdown that 
afflicted much of Southeast Asia and was also one of the underlying causes that led 
to the downfall of former President Soeharto. The same excuse is used by Indonesian 
companies, particularly claims of financial pressures and constraints that impact on 
their ability to comply. An additional claim being used is that to implement the 
obligations under the ILO Conventions is cost prohibitive for companies. It is 
suggested that the compliance required is also driving foreign investors to invest 
elsewhere where labor conditions are more employer friendly rather than employee 
friendly. It is beyond the scope of this paper to test the statistical analysis of these 
claims.  
In an attempt to counter this investment flight there is allegedly a tacit 
understanding that the Government will not diligently enforce these obligations. 
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Yet, whether this tacit understanding is covert or overt is irrelevant as most labor 
organizations and unions have exhibited a willingness to see enforcement of the 
minimum obligations applicable under the prevailing laws. This was highlighted in 
May 2006 when the Government indicated that it was preparing to amend the Labor 
Law (Law No. 13 of 2003) as labor was able to organize mass demonstrations and 
protests in opposition to the proposed changes. 
Another example of the lack of accord between the Government’s obligations 
under the various conventions it has signed and the implementation relates to child 
labor. Despite the Government’s stated seriousness in confronting this problem but 
the reality is that it has so far failed to succeed in eliminating the practice. The 
signing and ratifying of ILO Conventions No. 138 on the Minimum Age for 
Admission to Employment and No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor appear to be 
much easier than implementing the provisions required, particularly to give effect to 
the protections these conventions afford.  
The criticisms of the protections of Indonesian labor are not restricted to the 
domestic front but also apply on the international plane as well. The Government 
has been criticized for not doing enough to protect Indonesia’s migrant, legal or 
illegal, workers who have been abused in other countries. Various labor 
organizations and non-governmental organizations have demanded that the 
Government ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers. Nonetheless, the demand may prove to be in vain as the 
Convention will not automatically protect Indonesian migrant workers as many of 
the receiving countries of Indonesian migrant workers are not parties to the 
Convention.  
Another issue to garner widespread support is the trafficking of persons into 
and out of Indonesia for the purpose of prostitution. In February 2006 the 
Parliament initiated a draft Law to ban and criminalize human trafficking. 
Currently, the draft law is being discussed with the government. 
The final aspect that has not been adequately addressed is the bringing of 
those accused of past flagrant and grave breaches of human rights to justice. 
Although there have been some high profile trials for the East Timor and Tanjung 
Priok cases, the prosecutors have failed to bring any high-ranking officials to justice 
for their alleged roles in these breaches. One regional area where there remain a 
number of unanswered questions relating to flagrant and grave breaches is Aceh. 
During the period where Aceh was declared an Area of Military Operations there 
were persistent allegations of human rights violations. With the signing of the 
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Helsinki Agreement which in essence brought peace to the troubled region this is an 
issue that is now very much on the backburner.  
This lack of accountability in terms of testing these allegations also extends 
to the May riots of 1998, except for a few low-ranking police personnel. This is 
irrespective of the Komnas HAM findings that during the anti-government rallies by 
students in 1998 and 1999 at the campus of the Trisakti University and Semanggi 
interchange there were gross human rights violations committed. The Office of the 
Attorney General who is the competent authority to follow-up and where warranted, 
prosecute these violations has opted not to do so. 
 
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
With the collapse of the authoritarian Soeharto Regime it has been claimed 
that the enactment of legislation has become easier. This may or may not be true 
however the DPR continues to struggle to meet its own legislation targets almost 10 
years after the fall of the Soeharto Regime. It is true that the amount of legislation 
introduced to the DPR has increased significantly and the ease at which this 
legislation can be amended, repealed or annulled has become easier. A consequence 
of this focus is that law reform in Indonesia has narrowed to only mean legislation 
reform. 
The Constitution, for example, has been amended four times. There have been 
numerous pieces of legislation introduced and enacted as either laws or as 
regulations. Habibie was particularly proud of his administrations accomplishment 
of enacting more than sixty laws. 
This legislation reform has also reached the field of human rights. The 
following section of this paper will discuss these legislation developments. 
 
A. Domestic Legislation 
In 2000 the Indonesian Constitution was amended by the MPR 15 . The 
original construction of the Constitution recognized few human rights however the 
second series of amendments now recognizes various basic human rights. The 
provisions that deal directly with human rights are contained under Chapter X A. 
The Chapter contains 9 paragraphs. The first-eight paragraphs, Article 28(a) – (i) 
are a statement of the  basic human rights guaranteed to all Indonesian citizens. 
The last paragraph contains a minimum obligation.  
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The basic human rights are: the right to life16; the right to establish a family 
and for a child to have the right to live, grow, and develop17; the right to prosper and 
improve18; the right to be recognized and protected before the law and the right to 
work, equal opportunities in government and the right to citizenship19; the right to 
choose religion and the right of association and expression 20 ; the right to 
communicate and obtain information21; the right to protection and the right to be 
free from inhuman treatment22; the right to live in physical and spiritual prosperity; 
the right to receive facilities, the right to social security, and the right to own 
personal property 23 ; the right to life and right to be free from discriminative 
treatment24. 
Article 28 also provides a minimum obligation at Article 28(j); the obligation 
to respect the human rights of others and an obligation to accept restrictions in the 
exercise of rights and freedoms.25
There has also been a MPR Decree issued that requires all high level State 
agencies and the whole of the government apparatus to respect, uphold, and 
disseminate information regarding human rights to the general public, and to 
immediately ratify a number of United Nations’ instruments on human rights.26
The Indonesian Government has enacted 2 specific human rights related 
laws; the Human Rights Law27 and the Human Rights Court Law.  The Human 
Rights Law contains 106 Articles and enumerates many human rights. It sets out in 
considerable detail provisions relating to the right to life and the right not to be 
abducted and /or killed, the right to establish a family and bear children, the right to 
self-development, the right to justice, the right to freedom of the individual, the right 
to security, the right to welfare, the right to participate in the government, women’s 
rights, children’s rights, and the right to religious freedom. The Law also solidifies 
the existence of the Komnas HAM. Under this Law the members of Komnas HAM 
are appointed by the DPR which is different from previous members who were 
appointed by the President. The Law also provides general provisions on the Human 
Rights Court.  
The Human Rights Court Law28 contains 51 Articles. It sets out where the 
Court is to be established, its power and authorities, and the procedural law for 
arrest, detention, investigation and prosecution. The Law also deals with the 
procedure for examination before the court, witness protection, rehabilitation, and 
ad hoc courts. The ad hoc court is established for the purpose of examining and 
deciding gross violations of human rights before the Human Rights Court comes into 
effect. 29  The ad hoc court will examine cases recommended by the DPR and 
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stipulated in a President Decree.30 To date, there are two cases that have been 
examined by the ad hoc court using these previsions, namely: the East Timor and 
Tanjung Priok cases. 
These two Laws are considered to be an important reflection of Indonesia’s 
determination and commitment to improving its human rights practice record and to 
address past human rights abuses.  
Aside from enacting these 2 pieces of legislation, legislation reform also 
includes the repeal of laws considered to be in breach of basic human rights. 
Paramount among these pieces of repealed legislation is the often misused, abused, 
and controversial 1963 Law on Subversion.31
Indonesia took note of the South African Truth and Reconciliation model to 
address wide-scale past human rights violations and enacted the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Law (Komisi Konsiliasi dan Rekonsiliasi or abbreviated 
as ‘KKR’). The establishment of the Commission was proposed during the 
administration of former President Abdurrahman Wahid and became Law in 2004 
under the Megawati administration. 32  However, in December 2006 the 
Constitutional Court annulled the Law as it was declared unconstitutional. 
The 2 laws noted above are not the only human rights protections available 
to Indonesian citizens. Many Indonesian laws and regulations provide human rights 
protections, among others, the Labor Law,33 the Trade Union Law,34 the Press 
Law,35 the Child Protection Law,36 and the Citizenship Law37 each afford specific 
protections.  Other laws which make reference to basic human rights include the 
Advocates Law, 38  the National Education Law, 39  the Police Law, 40  and the 
Broadcasting Law.41  
 
B. The Ratification of International Instruments 
Prior to 1998 Indonesia had ratified a number of international instruments 
that dealt with human rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on 
the Rights of Child. 42  During the period from 1998 to 2006 several more 
international instruments were ratified. 
In 1998 Indonesia ratified the Convention against Torture and Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.43 In 1999 Indonesia also ratified 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.44
During 1999 and 2000 Indonesia ratified four International Labor 
Organization conventions, namely: ILO Convention No. 105 on the Abolition of 
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Forced Labor,45 ILO Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment, 46  ILO Convention No.111 on the Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation,47 and ILO Convention No. 182 on the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.48
In October 2005, Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights49 and at about the same time the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights was also ratified.50
Although Indonesia has yet to ratify the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, nevertheless some of the provisions under the Statue have already 
been adopted, and literally translated, to the Human Rights Court Law. The 
provisions adopted, among other are, two of the international crimes and command 
responsibility. 
 
C. Failure to Ensure Legislation Values Come into Practice 
Considering the significant amount of legislation passed and the number of 
international treaties and conventions signed and ratified in the period through to 
2006 the question though is whether this progress in legislation is reflected in 
proportional advances in human rights practices in Indonesia? Unfortunately, the 
simple answer to this question is, no. There still exists a wide gap between what is 
provided for under the Law and the reality. Any suggestion that breaches of human 
rights have ceased is clearly a misrepresentation of the current situation. There are 
a number of sources for this failure.  
First, and perhaps the most significant of these failures, is that the 
legislation was not purpose specific; it was not made for the purposes of upholding 
human rights. The legislation is passed with the intention of satisfying the pressure 
being applied from international, domestic NGOs, and even the Indonesian political 
elites who had an interest in maintaing their hold on power. Interestingly, 
improving human rights practices and conditions in Indonesia has not been the 
prime motivation for passing this legislation. 
Second, the infrastructure necessary to support the successful 
implementation of the legislation was not considered at all during the drafting 
process. The legal apparatus, for example, doea not have sufficient understanding of 
the concepts of human rights or their implementation. 
Third, a lack of strong law enforcement at the implementation stage. Law 
enforcers have been lenient in implementing the provisions designed to prevent or 
prosecute human rights violations. This has had the result of ensuring low levels of 
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compliance as there is simply no incentive to comply. Even where law enforcers want 
to enforce the provisions the drafting is so poor that the provisions are not clear 
enough to be implemented anyway as these provisions are often the result of 
compromise. One example of this are several of the provisions in the Human Rights 
Court Law which are literal interpretations of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The compromise in this case is that these provisions do not have 
any roots in Indonesian law and were included merely to satisfy international 
interestd that Indonesia had internationally recognized provisions within its law to 
deal with human rights violations. 
Finally, the fourth reason is a problem that relates to legislation in 
Indonesia generally. Any new legislation in Indonesia requires a change in the 
mindset of not only the community at large but specifically those tasked with 
enforcing the new provisions. In addition, legislation is difficult to implement 
because of the nature of Indonesia as a broad archipelagic nation where wide gaps in 
ability exist between the various provinces and a general lack of awareness from the 
general public that new legislation is even in place. 
In terms of the international instruments ratified during the administration 
of President Habibie, particularly the ILO conventions which were a great source of 
pride for the former President, the reality was that these ratifications were not 
immediately reflected in Indonesian law, at least not in a way that they might be 
enforced.. 
A quick overview of several of the conventions already ratified highlights 
this even more acutely. Despite the ratification of the Torture Convention, 
allegations that torture still occurs are frequently raised. Further, the 
implementation of regional autonomy permits provinces to have greater control over 
their legislation and in this regard the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
(Aceh) has implemented legislation that permits individuals to be caned. This is 
clearly in contravention to Indonesia’s obligations to prevent cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment. There is still legislation that discriminates against Indonesian 
of Chinese heritage even though Indonesia has ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  
This highlights that even where there is a commitment to transform these 
new obligations into national law the problems of implementation remain.  
If nothing else Indonesia’s experience shows that the simple ratification of 
international treaties and instruments does not translate into immediate 
improvements in the policies developed to implement a new human rights practices 
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regime. This in turn means that any significant improvements in the community as 
a whole are neither immediate nor guaranteed.  
As has been noted earlier the biggest difficulty encountered is that 
international treaties rarely take into consideration the specific conditions of any 
one country, the contracting states. This usually means that even where these 
provisions are transformed into a national regulatory framework the legal and 
community infrastructure to successfully implement the provisions does not exist.  
Second, international treaties are used by powerful states to impose their 
values on other States. The values may not be readily accepted by the society of the 
states that are to incorporate these provisions into their national law.  
Third, the government may be under formal obligations to report successful 
implementation however what is generally reported might not accord with the 
realities of the field.  
The basic conclusion for the Indonesian experience is that the ratification of 
international human rights treaties and instruments plus the development and 
enactment of national legislation has yet to have a significant influence in terms of 
improvement in human rights practices and conditions in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it 
must also be noted that progress in the development of Indonesia’s legal framework 
is critical to allow society to benchmark their basic human rights. 
 
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC TRIALS  FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES 
 
The demand for justice with respect to what transpired in East Timor 
during 1999 is more international than national but nevertheless resulted in the 
establishment of the first ever Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Indonesia.51 The 
Court was clearly a compromise between the demands of the international 
community for those responsible to be brought to an international tribunal if 
Indonesia was either unwilling or unable to do so and the Indonesian Government’s 
desire to prosecute those responsible in Indonesia.  
The Government was successful in convincing the international community 
that for the purposes of achieving justice it is best for the trials to take place in 
Indonesia. The Foreign Minister at the time, Alwi Shihab, was quoted in the Jakarta 
Post saying that, “It would be counterproductive (to have an international tribunal) 
because it would trigger a xenophobic response and allow violators to wrap 
themselves in the flag in an excessive spirit of nationalism.”52
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It must be noted that when the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court was being 
established that this was seen domestically as an opportunity to bring those 
allegedly responsible in the Tanjung Priok incident to justice as well. The DPR who 
has the authority to decide which past human rights abuses should be examined and 
decided by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court decided that apart from the East Timor 
allegations that the Tanjung Priok allegations were also to be examined. The 
inclusion of Tanjung Priok allegations was considered an important step in 
highlighting that the establishment of the ad hoc Human Rights Court was not 
merely the result of Indonesia surrendering to international demand. 
The Ad Hoc Human Rights Court is attached to the Central Jakarta District 
Court. The judges appointed to the Court include both career and non-career or ad 
hoc judges. The ad hoc judges were mostly appointed from academic backgrounds. 
 
A. The East Timor Trials 
In Indonesia, the establishment of Ad Hoc Human Rights Court is the 
result of recommendations from Komnas HAM on the incidents alleged to have 
taken place. On 22 September 1999 Komnas HAM created a Commission for Human 
Rights Violations in East Timor (Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran HAM di Timor 
Timur abbreviated as ‘KPP HAM’). KPP HAM is composed of both government 
officials and non-governmental human rights activists. On 31 January 2000 it 
produced a comprehensive report naming Indonesian and East Timorese officials 
and military leaders responsible for flagrant and gross violations of human rights.53
The Office of the Attorney General had followed-up the report by Komnas 
HAM by naming those in the report on indictments setting in motion the prosecution 
process. The Attorney General submitted 12 cases involving 18 defendants to the Ad 
Hoc Human Rights Court. The indictments named many high-ranking officials from 
the military, police, and civilian ranks of the East Timor Government at the time of 
the allegations are said to have occurred. These indictments included the 
Commander in Chief of the Army responsible for East Timor, the Chief of East 
Timor Police, and the Governor, among others.  
Despite the high-ranking military, police, and civilian officials in the 
indictments, the indictments were also notable for the names not included. The 
Office of the Attorney General made a conscious decision not to name other high-
ranking officials in the Habibie Government of the time in spite of the fact that they 
were specifically mentioned in the KPP HAM report. The Attorney General justified 
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this decision based on the limited time and places of the allegations to be prosecuted 
and the existence of the Presidential Decree which established the Court. 
The decision of the Attorney General was not received well by the 
international community whose response clearly suggested that they believed that 
the former Chief of the Armed Forces, General Wiranto, must also stand trial. 
Domestically, the decision was criticized by human rights institutions, such as the 
Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI). 
In the 12 cases that proceeded to the prosecution phase, the defendants 
were all charged with crimes against humanity under Article 7(b) and Article 9 of 
the Human Rights Court Law 54 . The defendants were not charged as direct 
perpetrators or masterminds of the breaches but rather they have been charged 
based on superior responsibility under Article 42 of the Human Rights Court Law55. 
The twelve verdicts handed down by the Human Rights Court resulted in 
acquittals for 12 defendants and convictions recorded for 6 others. The 6 individuals 
convicted included Soedjarwo, the former Dili military commander who was 
sentenced to 5 years in jail and Adam Damiri, the former Military Command Chief 
overseeing the then Province of East Timor. Adam Damiri was found guilty by the 
Court irrespective of the fact that the prosecutor demanded an acquittal.  Two East 
Timorese citizens were convicted; Abilio Soares, the former Governor was sentenced 
to 3 years, and Eurico Guteres, the former leader of the Red and White militia was 
sentenced to 10 years and 6 months imprisonment, respectively. All those convicted 
were not required to commence their terms of imprisonment until their respective 
appeals were heard and decided. The appeal process saw all but 1 of the convictions 
overturned. The only one not successful to date is Guteres. Guteres is currently 
serving his sentence, but has requested a case review (peninjauan kembali) by the 
Supreme Court. 
Human rights activists have been quick to slam the prosecutions and the 
verdicts of the Court as a sham and a whitewash56. The Institute for Policy Research 
and Advocacy (ELSAM), one of the many Indonesian human rights institutions 
actively monitoring the proceedings, was unequivocal in stating that the trials were 
a complete failure. For ELSAM the process was defective from the outset and 
therefore it came as no surprise that the process failed to bring the perpetrators of 





B. The Tanjung Priok Trials 
The Tanjung Priok trials were the second series of trials to take place for 
grave breaches of human rights violations in Indonesia. The Tanjung Priok trials 
stem from allegations made against government and military personnel for killings 
and detentions of protestors that occurred in 1984. The trial is based on the Komnas 
HAM findings of 11 October 2000. The findings recommended that 23 people face 
prosecution. Out of these 23, former Armed Forces Chief Gen (ret) L.B. Moerdani 
and former Jakarta Military Commander Gen (ret.) Try Sutrisno, who also served as 
Indonesia’s Vice President, were named. However, when the final indictment was 
issued by the Office of the Attorney General these two names had not been included. 
The Tandjung Priok trial was in fact four separate trials invlolving 17 
defendants.  
 
C. Unsatisfactory Results – The Causes 
The trials that have taken place so far under the human rights court regime 
have ended with outcomes that many people have found to be unsatisfactory. The 
East Timor trials and the Tanjung Priok trials have resulted in acquittals for most 
of the senior officers involved in each of these cases. 
There are many reasons being given for the unsatisfactory outcomes. 
Paramount among these reasons is that the trials, although warranted, resulted 
primarily from international pressure and to also defuse mounting domestic 
pressure to hold those responsible to account. Also undermining the legitimacy of the 
trials is that many of those named after the completion of the investigation by the 
East Timor and Tanjung Priok KPP-HAM were inexplicably absent from the 
indictments.  
Another reason for the unsatisfactory results is that most prosecutors and 
judges are not familiar with international human rights law and international 
crimes. This fundamental lack of knowledge has often been characterized as 
incompetence and indicative of a lack of will on the part of the government to 
seriously prosecute these cases. Despite specialized courses and training in 
international law there has still been questions concerning the professionalism, 
independence, and impartiality of the prosecutors.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that impartiality is a two-way street as 
many judges were under pressure to find defendants guilty irrespective of the 
quality or amount of evidence adduced at trial. The concern that judges had for what 
the international and national reaction would be meant that judges defendants 
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guilty in spite of the evidence being insufficient to support the indictment.57 This has 
allowed convictions and sentences to be recorded that are outside the parameters 
provided for in the relevant laws.58  
The shortcomings in the legal system are evident with respect to protections 
afforded to witnesses that would otherwise be considered key witnesses for the 
prosecution. The lack of these basic protections means that witnesses are reluctant 
to come forward and even more reluctant to testify. The lack of witnesses meant that 
prosecutors only had minimum amounts of documentary evidence to work with.  
The biggest dilemma for prosecutors and judges is that the nature of the 
crimes alleged are not the ordinary crimes that many prosecutors have dealt with in 
the past. Secondly, the defendant in these cases would most likely not have been 
prosecuted had East Timor remained a part of Indonesia and in any event an even 
bigger dilemma remained, as many of these defendants were considered to be heroes 
in the defense of Indonesia’s national unity. 
The lack of indictments, prosecutions, and convictions of former high ranking 
officials is indicative of the status given to those individuals within Indonesian 
culture. It would appear that status or former status as a high ranking official 
affords these individuals an unwarranted degree of immunity from prosecution.  
Another concern is that the number of judges to deal with all the matters 
before the court system is insufficient, particularly when one factors in the complete 
lack of infrastructure and resource support. Judges are rarely afforded staff such as 
clerks or research assistants. In terms of infrastructure judges do not have sufficient 
library, computer, and Internet access to do the research themselves.59 Furthermore, 
judges are not given sufficient time when rendering decisions as Indonesian laws 
generally place time restrictions on the amount of time afforded to a judge to render 
their decision. 
Another source of failure is the constant questioning of whether the trials are 
seriously in pursuit of justice or merely some attempt at revenge, as it seems clear 
that some people were put on trial after the fall of the former President Soeharto to 
satisfy a need for revenge rather than the pursuit of justice for the alleged crimes 






V. ASSESSMENT OF THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE PROMOTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The war on terror as declared by the US President, George W. Bush, after 
the 9/11 incident has had a direct impact on the promotion and defense of human 
rights in Indonesia.  
In Indonesia, the war on terror has been seen by many as not a war on 
terror but rather a war on human rights.60 This is in spite of the fact that Indonesian 
has been a victim of several terrorist actions including the first Bali bombings and 
the Marriot bombing. The Indonesian public believes that combating terrorism and 
terrorist acts must not violate the law, must respect human rights, and cannot 
discriminate against people based on their race or religion. 
From an Indonesian perspective the inconsistencies in the US and 
Australian policies of preaching human rights to Indonesia, yet systematically 
allowing for these same human rights to be violated in the war on terror undermines 
any moral high ground that either country may have held previously. This has led to 
criticism of the Indonesian government for bowing too much to the pressure of the 
US and its allies in the war on terror, particularly at the expense of the human 
rights of Indonesian citizens. 
There are, at least, five reasons why the war on terror has had a negative 
impact on human rights conditions in Indonesia: 
First, Indonesian citizens accused of being terrorists or sympathizers aiding 
and abetting terrorists have not been treated according to prevailing human rights 
norms. Yet, these actions were not just against Indonesians at home but in the 
aftermath of the first Bali bombings Australian authorities took specific action 
against Indonesian Muslims residing in Australia. To single out one particular group 
is clearly a breach of an acknowledged human right purporting to protect individuals 
from discrimination based on religion or ethnicity.  
Furthermore, sometimes there is no other information other than an alleged 
terrorist or suspect is in custody. For example in the cases of Al-Faruq and Hambali 
there is no information on their whereabouts other than they are in US custody. Also 
in relation to these cases it is unknown whether either of these detainees is 
represented or accompanied by legal counsel during questioning. This has led to 
demands from the general public that Hambali be extradited to Indonesia but also 
criticisms that Indonesia has not been able to secure access to Hambali even though 
he is an Indonesian citizen. The government has tried to defend itself by suggesting 
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that because the charge is one of an extra-ordinary crime it has decided not to 
exercise any protection obligations owed to its citizens abroad. Furthermore, the 
government has even gone so far as to say that Hambali’s nationality is not clear 
and as such there is no obligation to protect him.  
The Indonesian public has asked,and now demands, that the Philippines 
government undertakes an enquiry into the unnatural death of an Indonesian 
citizen, Al-Ghozi, whilst in military custody in the Philippines. It is generally 
believed that Al-Ghozi was executed by the Philippines military prior to a visit by 
US President, George W. Bush, to the Philippines and South East Asia. 
Nevertheless, and not surprisingly in light of the allegation, the Philippines 
government has so far been unwilling to do so.  
Second, international pressure is mounting on the Indonesian government 
to arrest several Muslim leaders, such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who is considered by 
the US and Australia to be the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. The police and 
prosecutors appeared to comply with this demand in spite of a solid legal foundation 
or evidence to do so. Despite, this pressure the Court found Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
guilty of immigration violations and a suspicious conspiracy. However, in 2006 the 
Supreme Court in its case review cleared Ba’asyir from all conspiracy charges and in 
effect absolved him of any involvement in the Bali Bombing of 2002.  
The contradiction between the demands for Indonesia to prosecute 
suspected terrorists and terrorist sympathizers is stark with respect to the 
treatment of Ba’asyir and the lack of any demands on the Philippines government to 
investigate and prosecute any violations of human rights norms in the unnatural 
death of Al-Ghozi. 
Third, the manner in which the US is processing and not prosecuting 
terrorists, such as those suspects held at Guantanamo Bay, has resulted in the US 
losing the moral high ground as the pre-eminent defender of human rights not only 
throughout the world but particularly in Indonesia. 
Fourth, the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism has been criticized for not 
giving due consideration to human rights issues.61 The Law is seen as the revival of 
the former Anti-Subversion Law that had been revoked for among other reasons its 
inconsistency with accepted human rights practices. The Law provides wide-
reaching powers to the police to detain and arrest suspected terrorists through the 
use of pre-emptive action and intelligence in violation of accepted human rights 
norms wherever the suspicion relates to terrorism or terrorist activity. 
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Fifth, a number of persons have reportedly disappeared or have been 
forcibly taken into custody by the police due to their alleged terrorist links. The 
police have apprehended these alumni of the Afghanistan conflict without following 
accepted due processes of law. The police consistently rejected allegations that they 
have in fact kidnapped Muslim activists under the guise of the provisions of the 
Anti-Terrorism Law. 
The war on terror has relaxed external pressure on the Indonesian 
government with respect to human rights. Foreign governments were ready to give 
Indonesia a pass on human rights abuses so long as the government cooperated in 
the war on terror. The US, for example, who had been overt in their concern for 
human rights in Indonesia have ceased all overt pressure in favor of securing 
Indonesia’s support in the war on terror. 
The Indonesian public has been surprised by the lack of scrutiny on 
Indonesia’s human rights record from international NGOs, particularly for human 
rights abuses occurring in the war on terror. This is further exacerbated by the fact 
that these same international NGOs who remain silent on the treatment of 
Indonesian citizens arrested abroad on allegations of terrorism. To many 
Indonesians this evidences a double standard when criticizing Indonesia’s human 
rights practices and record. 
The negative impact on human rights as a consequence of the war on terror 
has resulted in the Indonesian public questioning whether human rights are only an 
avenue to pressure Indonesia into changes or an intrinsic value worthy of universal 
protection. This has lead to claims that human rights are a means to an end and 
that end is a new colonialism.62
The war on terror has encouraged human rights abuses, this time with the 
blessing of countries that have traditionally been referred to as ‘defenders of human 
rights’. This has metamorphosed into an expectation from the international 
community that countries like Indonesia will permit the abuse of human rights in 
the pursuit of terrorists or those suspected of aiding and abetting terrorism. This is 
seen in the resumption of training activities between the Australian Defense Forces 
and the feared Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus). These ties were broken off in 
1999 when Kopassus was accused of being behind and orchestrating the mass 
violence perpetrated in East Timor. However, Australia’s Defense Minister in 
arguing for these ties to be restored noted that Kopassus provides Indonesia’s main 
counter-terrorism capability and it is critical that they have all the latest technology 
and equipment for this war on terror. 
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VI. THE WORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 
 
The human rights institutions of Indonesia can be divided simply as either 
government or private.  
Under the Soeharto administration there is only one government institution 
to promote and deal with human rights issues, the Komnas HAM. The Komnas 
HAM was established in 1993 to undertake study, research, counseling, monitoring, 
and mediation related to human rights. The Komnas HAM became the focal point of 
government institutions for dealing with human rights. During this period, the 
government generally followed the recommendations of Komnas HAM. 
In relation to private institutions, a leading human rights institution is the 
Legal Aid Foundation (LBH). LBH was founded by Adnan Buyung Nasution in the 
1970s. The LBH is widely acknowledged for its criticisms of human rights abuses by 
the government and the military. 
In post-Soeharto administrations, government institutions dealing with 
human rights issues have been numerous. The institutions include the defunct 
Department for Human Rights which has been restructured and now is part of the 
Department of Law and Human Rights. Within in the Department or Law and 
Human Rights there are two agencies dealing with human rights issues. 63  In 
addition there are a number of Departments that have specific sections to deal with 
human rights issues. And finally the Komnas HAM will continue to exist. 
Despite the much more democratic governance and greatly enhanced legal 
regulatory framework in Indonesia the numerous human rights institutions noted 
earlier have failed to significantly improve the human rights practices in Indonesia. 
This has given rise to another problem; namely, the lack of coordination between the 
various institutions. The primary reason for this lack of coordination is the ego of 
each of the individual institutions endeavoring to out do the other in the field of 
human rights.  
Komnas HAM is no longer as highly regarded as it was in the Soeharto era. 
Recently, the Chairman of Komnas HAM, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, 
questioned the government’s and the DPR’s commitment to maintain the 
commission that has, since its inception, been tasked with upholding human rights. 
According to the Chairman since Komnas HAM relies on the Office ot the Attorney 
General for prosecutions, then it is difficult to see the prosecutions of those accused 
 137
of abusing human rights if the Attorney General ignores Komnas HAM 
recommendations.64
Furthermore, there have been documented problems inside of the Komnas 
HAM itself relating to both funding and conflicts between the various members 
themselves. 
Another issue that has not been extensively studied and documented is the 
overlap between the various private institutions operating in the field. For example, 
apart from the Legal Aid Foundation, there is the Commission for Disappearances 
Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), Impartial, Study Institute for Public 
Advocacy (ELSAM), and Indonesian Legal Aid Society (PBHI), as well as the various 
Centers for Human Rights attached to universities. 
Furthermore, there are NGOs, particularly in the field of human rights that 
have been established through sponsorship from the government. High-ranking 
officials are known to encourage their acquaintances to establish NGOs. These 
NGOs are sometimes used as a means of competing against an already established 
NGO to offer an alternative human rights perspective of the same problem. 
Government sponsored human rights NGOs tend to have a short lifespan as they 
tend to dissolve once the officials have left office. 
Projects to improve human rights practices have been pursued by 
institutions, but unfortunately some are for commercial purposes. The 
commercialization of NGOs has prompted legitimate questions concerning whether 
these NGOs have become mere vehicles to secure funding or whether they are really 
motivated by the altruistic ideals of defending and promoting human rights. It is a 
question that must be answered to address the political, commercial or other 
purposes that NGOs pursue. 
A fundamental problem with private institutions is funding. Human rights 
NGOs rely heavily on foreign donors. Once the donors cease their contributions, 
these NGOs will struggle. In this sense, NGOs are seen as prolonging the interest of 
foreign interests. Once there is no interest from foreign donors, NGOs will encounter 
increasing difficulties to survive as their domestic donors and sponsors are limited. 
This feeds into the paranoia held in some circles that NGOs are funded by foreign 
donors only for the purpose of promoting and extending foreign interests in 
sovereign Indonesia.  
The most obvious example of this is the difficulties encountered by the LBH 
when foreign donors began to reduce their funding commitments; the question 
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became whether these donors were intent on upholding human rights or fighting 
against and attempting to subvert an authoritarian regime in Indonesia? 
The next problem is that private human rights institutions no longer 
possess the charisma that they used to possess under the Soeharto administration. 
As the government becomes more democratic and provides increased importance to 
human rights issues, human rights NGOs have lost there importance. Many NGOs 
suddenly appeared to lose there critical nature once Wahid became President. The 
most plausible reason for this is that prior to becoming President, Wahid maintained 
many close ties with the NGO community. 
The final problem here is the many of the NGOs have overlapping fields of 
expertise and specialty without maintaining sound networking practices. 
 
VII. CLOSING REMARKS 
 
During the period of 1998 to 2006, human rights practices remained 
unchanged in Indonesia irrespective of the better commitment made by the four 
Presidents in the much improved legislation dealing with human rights and in 
becoming parties to various international agreements and a growing number of 
institutions. In short, structural and legal change has not contributed much to an 
improved human rights condition in Indonesia. Violations of human rights continue 
to take place, not only by the government but also by the people, the mass media, 
and many others. 
The first obstacle is improvement in the respect for human rights cannot 
solely be the responsibility of the President. Under a more democratic government 
the President alone will not be able to make conditions better. There are many more 
actors that can be instrumental in bringing about a much improved respect of 
human rights. 
Second, domestic legislation and ratification of international instruments 
have not contributed to any measurable improvement in human rights conditions in 
Indonesia. This is because in a transitional democracy like Indonesia what is stated 
in the laws may not automatically be reflected in society at large.  
Third, the prosecution of past abuses of grave human rights violations has 
been unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. It would not only be misleading but 
also unrealistic to expect international and domestic pressure to enforce justice for 
victims in Indonesia. 
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Fourth, the US led war on terror has further deteriorated Indonesia’s public 
confidence for respect of human rights. 
Lastly, there has been a lack of focus in the promotion of human rights due 





                                                 
1 There are many reports which indicate the poor condition of human rights practices in 
Indonesia, such as the Amnesty International report (http://web.amnesty.org/), Human 
Rights Watch (http://hrw.org/), and the US Department of State Report on Human 
Rights Practices (http://www.state.gov/).  
2  Soeharto resigned from office on May 21 under pressure from student activists 
supported by broader Indonesian community. 
3 Human Rights Law and Establishment of the Ad Hoc Human Rights Tribunal Law. 
4 The Anti-Subversion Law was lifted as were regulations that restrict freedom of press 
and freedom of speech. 
5 Presidential Decree 129 of 1998 on the National Action Plan for Human Rights. The 
plan of action has four main pillars: (i) preparation for ratification of international 
human rights instruments; (ii) dissemination of information and education on human 
rights; (iii) implementation of priority issues on human rights; and (iv) implementation 
of the international human rights instruments that have been ratified by Indonesia. The 
plan of action ran until 2003, but was not followed by either the Wahid or Megawati 
administration.  
6 This will be discussed extensively later. 
7 During the Soeharto administration, Indonesian Chinese were not allowed to use their 
Chinese names, Chinese script, or to promote their culture. 
8 One of the criticisms is that Megawati was worried that bringing military and police 
personnel to the Human Rights Tribunal would result in these people undermining her 
mandate to govern and weakening the the country. Interesting Megawati is on the 
record stating that sentencing corrupters to death would be in breach of the human 
rights of corrupters. This was seen as tacit support from the Megawati administration 
and activists argue that this has resulted in increased levels of corruption throughout 
the country. 
9 “Human rights activists targeted in terror attacks,” Jakarta Post, March 14, 2002; 
“Unidentified men shoot human rights lawyer's car,” Jakarta Post, Nov. 13, 2001. 
10  These usually involve demonstration held by students who demanded former 
President Soeharto face trial or demand that Megawati resign as President. Casualties 
cannot be avoided. 
11 Law Number 9 of 1998 on the Freedom of Expression in Public. 
12 Rakyat Merdeka is a daily newspaper. In one case one former editor of the newspaper 
is found guilty for insulting the chairman of the Golkar political party who was also 
serving as speaker of the DPR, Akbar Tanjung. The case was brought after the paper 
published a caricature depicting Akbar Tanjung shirtless and dripping with sweat trying 
to appeal his corruption conviction.  In another case, an editor is prosecuted for insulting 
Megawati as Indonesia’s President. This is after the newspaper ran a series of headlines 
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concerning controversial government policies related to fuel and basic commodity price 
increases. One headline said the President’s mouth smells like diesel. 
13 Tempo is a leading weekly magazine. The case involves an article run by Tempo which 
alleged Tomy Winata stood to profit from a fire that had razed a textile market in 
Jakarta. In this case Tomy Winata filed charges of libel seeking substantial damages 
against the co-founder of Tempo. The article also caused Tomy Winata’s supporters to 
come to the Tempo office and violently attack the reporter who wrote the story. In this 
case the attackers were found guilty for their actions but were handed only a light 
sentence. 
14 One of the criticisms came from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) in its report for the WTO General Council Review of Trade Policies of 
Indonesia, see: http://www.icftu.org/www/pdf/indonesiacls2003.pdf 
15  The original Constitution only contains six provisions that explicitly provide for 
human rights issues. 
16 Every person shall have the right to live and to defend his/her life and existence. 
17 (1) Every person shall have the right to establish a family and to procreate based upon 
lawful marriage.  
(2) Every child shall have the right to live, to grow and to develop, and shall have the 
right to protection from violence and discrimination. 
18 (1) Every person shall have the right to better him/herself through the fulfillment of 
his/her basic needs, the right to education and to benefit from science and technology, 
art and culture, for the purpose of improving the quality of his/her life and for the 
welfare of the human race. (2) Every person shall have the right to improve him/herself 
through collective struggle for his/her rights to develop his/her society, nation and state.  
19  (1) Every person shall have the right to recognition, guarantees, protection and 
certainty before a just law, and to equal treatment before the law.  
(2) Every person shall have the right to work and to receive fair and proper recompense 
and treatment in employment. (3) Every citizen shall have the right to obtain equal 
opportunities in government.  
(4) Every person shall have the right to citizenship status. 
20 (1) Every person shall be free to embrace and to practice the religion of his/her choice, 
to choose one's education, to choose one's employment, to choose one's citizenship, and to 
choose one's place of residence within the state territory, to leave it and to subsequently 
return to it.  
(2) Every person shall have the right to the freedom to hold beliefs (kepercayaan), and to 
express his/her views and thoughts, in accordance with his/her conscience.  
(3) Every person shall have the right to the freedom to associate, to assemble and to 
express opinions.  
21 Every person shall have the right to communicate and to obtain information for the 
purpose of the development of his/her self and social environment, and shall have the 
right to seek, obtain, possess, store, process and convey information by employing all 
available types of channels.  
22 (1) Every person shall have the right to protection of self, family, honor, dignity, and 
property, and shall have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the 
threat of fear to do or not do something that is a human right.  
(2) Every person shall have the right to be free from torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatment, and shall have the right to obtain political asylum from another country. 
23 (1) Every person shall have the right to live in physical and spiritual prosperity, to 
have a home and to enjoy a good and healthy environment, and shall have the right to 
obtain medical care.  
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(2) Every person shall have the right to receive facilitation and special treatment to have 
the same opportunity and benefit in order to achieve equality and fairness.  
(3) Every person shall have the right to social security in order to develop oneself fully as 
a dignified human being.  
(4) Every person shall have the right to own personal property, and such right may not 
be arbitrarily interfered with by any party. 
24  (1) The rights to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought and conscience, 
freedom of religion, freedom from enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, 
and the right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights 
that cannot be limited under any circumstances.  
(2) Every person shall have the right to be free from discriminative treatment based 
upon any grounds whatsoever and shall have the right to protection from such 
discriminative treatment.  
(3) The cultural identities and rights of traditional communities shall be respected in 
accordance with the development of times and civilizations.  
(4) The protection, advancement, upholding and fulfillment of human rights are the 
responsibility of the state, especially the government  
(5) For the purpose of upholding and protecting human rights in accordance with the 
principle of a democratic and law-based state, the implementation of human rights shall 
be guaranteed, regulated and set forth in laws and regulations. 
25 (1) Every person shall have the duty to respect the human rights of others in the 
orderly life of the community, nation and state.  
(2) In exercising his/her rights and freedoms, every person shall have the duty to accept 
the restrictions established by law for the sole purposes of guaranteeing the recognition 
and respect of the rights and freedoms of others and of satisfying just demands based 
upon considerations of morality, religious values, security and public order in a 
democratic society. 
26 MPR Decree No. XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights 
27 Law 39 of 1999 
28 Law 26 of 2000 
29 Id., art. 43 (1). 
30 Id., art. 43 (2). 
31 Law 11 of 1963 and it was revoked by Law 26 of 1999. 
32 Law 27 of 2004 
33 Law 13 of 2003 
34 Law 21 of 2000 
35 Law 40 of 1999 
36 Law 23 of 2002 
37 Law 12 of 2006 
38 Law 18 of 2003 
39 Law 20 of 2003 
40 Law 2 of 2002 
41 Law 32 of 2002 
42 It was ratified in 1984 and 1990 respectively. 
43 Law 5 of 1998 
44 Law 29 of 1999 
45 Law 19 of 1999 
46 Law 20 of 1999 
47 Law 21 of 1999 
48 Law 1 of 2000 
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49 Law 11 of 2005 
50 Law 12 of 2005 
51 It should be noted that the Human Rights Tribunal and the ad hoc Human Rights 
Tribunal is slightly different. Although the two tribunals are established based on the 
Human Rights Tribunal Law, however, the ad hoc Human Rights Tribunal  was 
established to examine and decide past cases of flagrant human rights abuses.  
52 “U.S. gives Indonesia more aid, time on human rights,” Jakarta Post Jan. 22, 2000. 
53 The Executive Summary of the report in Indonesian, is accessible at 
http://www.elsam.or.id/publikasi/padhoc/EXECUTIVE%20SUMMARY%20KPP%20HAM
%20Tim-tim%20oleh%20Komnas%20HAM.pdf 
54 Article 7 of the Human Rights Tribunal Law provides for two types of gross violations 
of human rights (international crimes), namely: genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Article 9 provides the elements of crimes against humanity. 
55 Article 42 of the Human Rights Tribunal is a direct interpretation of Article 28 of the 
Rome Statute. 
56 “Justice Denied for East Timor Indonesia's Sham Prosecutions, the Need to 
Strengthen the Trial Process in East Timor, and the Imperative of U.N. Action,” Human 
Rights Watch available at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor1202bg.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2003) 
57 If previously judges are afraid of the powerful elite, now they are afraid of the public 
because they are the ones’ who hold power. 
58 In Abilio Soares case the sentence handed-down was for 3 years even though the Law 
provides that the minimum sentence is to be 10 years. 
59 See: Progress Report VII Ad Hoc Tribunal for East Timor by ELSAM (Indonesian), 
Oct. 7, 2002 available at 
http://www.elsam.or.id/publikasi/padhoc/progress%20report%20VII.PDF 
60 It was reported that Indonesia’s second largest Muslim organization has expressed 
concern with the security forces' fight against terrorism, including the Bali attack 
investigation, saying the process was confusing and ignored human rights. See: 
“Religious leaders want police to respect human rights,” Jakarta Post, Nov. 13, 2002. 
61 Law 16 of 2003 
62 Former Chairman of Golkar Party, Pinantun Hutasoit, said that the human rights 
promotion has become an instrument for new colonialism. See “Pinantun: HAM 
Dijadikan Alat Neo Kolonialis,” Republika Online, October 13, 2003 available at 
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/online/2003/10/13/142911.shtm (last visited October 
14, 2003).  
63 One agency is referred to as the Directorate General for Protection of Human Rights 
which succeeded the former Department of Human Rights after its dissolution. The 
other is the Human Rights Research and Development Agency. 
64 “Hakim pledges to fight for human rights,” Jakarta Post, Sep. 14, 2002. 
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